to the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, directed his critical operations for or against them from the secure base of orthodox Christianity. Psellus was followed in a broken line of philosophic succession by John Italus, Michael of Ephesus, Eustratius of Nicea, Theodore Ptochoprodromus, Leo Magentinus, John Mauropus, Tzetzes, Anna Comnena and Nicephorus Blemmydes. These are little more than names and none of them rose above the merit of more or I less intelligent comentators. But in Gemistus Pletho, born in the middle of the fourteenth century, we find a man whose native vigor and independence of mind, fired by a crisis in the affairs oHÜis country and of the world, led him to throw down a challenge tjjthe accepted philosophy.
ii;i The accepted philosophy was, of course, Christianity, fortified b^ the logic and, in part, by the metaphysical system of Aristotle. Thanks mainly to Thomas Aquinas this reconciliation had been Effected in the West and in the East too the influence of Aquinas was felt, where in Pletho's time some of his works had been translated into Greek. To Pletho, however, inspired at an early -age by the glories of ancient Hellas 1 ), Christianity seemed the •canker which had corrupted the heart of Greek civilization and sapped its strength. We shall probaly never know why he fled in youth to the Turkish court 2 but it is hard to resist the surmise that it was to escape the odium incurred by his pagan views. But where Christ had failed to win his loyalty Mohammed failed «till more signally. He returned to Gre'ece, which was gradually falling under the dominance of the Ottoman power. He knew the Turk and loved Greece too well to acquiese.e in her manifest fate by withdrawing to the munificent courts of Italy. Hellenism represented to him all that was worth while in civilization. Yet the Greece about him was degenerate and corrupt, a degradation due, Pletho believed, to her faulty organization and views of life 3 ). This was his way of laying her degeneracy to the charge of the Church and Christianity. If his diagnosis was veiled, his remedy to be still more covert. His real conviction was that only e, Patroiogia,:series. Graeca, GLX, 639 D. 2) ibid. «39; B. *) Cf. the writer's Georgius Gemistus Pletho' of Plato and Arietotle (Menasha, Wie., 1921) , 87. a return to her ancient spirit and vigor could make Greece able to save herself, or indeed worthy to be saved. Such a return involved the adoption of the appropriate beliefs and organization, which, in his opinion, were Platonism and a political and judicial arrangement somewhat akin to that described in Plato's Laws, To aim openly at this change was obviously impossible in his day 4 ) The first step was to attack the great obstacle to its consummation. This was Christianity, which had recently taken to itself as an ally Aristotelianism. His assault on the received religion, therefore, took the from of a criticism of the philosophy of Aristotle. This wa& the inner significance of the tract % . De Differentia (περί ων Λριΰτοτελης προς Πλάτωνα οιαφέρεται). This purpose was readily divined by other scholars of the day and helps to explain the extraordinary animus shown in the debate arising from it 5 ).
Gaza took no small part in this debate. It is not the writer 's purpose to describe that part but to present evidence to show that the title apparently attached to one of the four tracts written by him does not correctly represent the position argued in it. Thi& error has led to a misconception of the philosophical position taken by the tract. Unfortunately, this tract is not included in the manuscripts which Dr. Stein has so kindly lent to the writer.
The title of the tract is usually given as ότι ή φναις βουλεύεται. It dates from 1459 6 ). As has been several times pointed out by scholars there was for a while doubt as to its authorship. Hodius 7 } suspected that it was really from the hand of Bessarion and identified it with a letter which we now know was a reply to this tract 8 ). It was natural for Hodius to infer from the title that the tract was opposed to the Aristotleian point of view and hence was not from the hand of Gaza, who usually defended Aristotle. ), noting the difficulty raised by Hodius, surmised, but without giving reasons, that the title of Gaza's tract should be ότι ή φνσις ου βονλενετα*. The difficulty and suggestion were passed over by Gaspary 10 ). Since Dr. Stein has seen the manuscript and yet does not insert the ου 11 ), it is safe to assume that it is actually not in the title, which was probably added by a scribe or librarian without a very careful perusal of the work. A consideration of the substance of it leaves us no option but to suppose that the title is incorrectly written.
It is "seldom possible to reason safely about the content of a work that one has never seen but in this case the argument of the tract can be recovered from an dutside source hitherto unused for this purpose. Book VI of a volume printed at Venice in 1469 (third ed. 1516) entitled Bessarionis Opera Varia, contains the account of a debate on teleology in nature. The debate took its rise from Pletho's De Differentia and the first polemic in it was by Theodore Gaza. Bessarion gives the substance of this tract. Now Dr. Stein states that the content of the Greek tract of Gaza, entitled ότι f t φύσις βουλώνεται, indicates it to bethe opening tract of the debate on the subject 12 ). We may safely conclude that it is the one which Bessarion summarized, Gaza's argument in answer to Pletho was based on the one used by Gennadius earlier in the general debate between the Platonists and Aristotelians. A brief review of this debate as far as it relates to teleology in nature is necessary for a grasp of Gaza's part.
Aristotle, as has been pointed out; had held that nature does not plan but nevertheless acts toward an end Pletho objected in the De Differentia that this was an inconsistent position and in unstable equilibrium between that of the Atomists, who denied all purpose in nature, and the correct (the Platonic) view that natural objects in themselves irrational are directed by an intelligence outside themselves 13 ). Gennadius, afterwards 'the Patriarch of Constantinople, writing in 1448, and more zealous for the Church than for Aristotle, flatly contradicted Pletho's interpretation of Aristotle's meaning. Aristotle had said, to be sure, he argued, that nature does not plan but he had maintained it against those who held that nature merely plans or deliberates but does not foresee and direct. By ovlevsa&at Aristotle had meant άγνοεΐν μεν δητείν δε (to cast about for means as yet unknown) and that nature did not do this but was rather a mind presiding over phenomena (νους Θ&ος έφίστησι τοίς φνύει γιγνομένοις 14 ) . ©' Pletho's reply need not detain us. When Gaza in 1459 reopened the question his defense of Aristotle followed Gennadius's tactics. He argued, as reported by Bessarion, that nature "nihil consulto agit", since "consultatio" is employed when we contemplate acts whose effectiveness as means to a desired end is unknown and uncertain. But, he went on, both end and means are certain and known in the case of nature and of art. Neither art iiot nature, therefore, consult at but the former acts with officium .and nature with prudentia 15 ). Whether the whole of this argument follows Gennadius we have no means of knowing until his reply to Pletho is available in its entirety 16 ), but as far s we can infer Gennadius's argument from Petho's reply to it Gaza has followed Gennadius almost exactly. The only difference appears to be in the form of the minor premise. Gennadius stated that nature is a divine mind presiding overhand so knowing, natural phenomena, while Gaza made the same statement in -effect by saying that the phenomena of nature progressing toward an end were known. But both argued Ότι ή ου βονλεν&αι. Gaza's tract ought to be so cited in the future.
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